What To Do About Pharma CEO Compensation
6 CommentsBy Ed Silverman // March 22nd, 2011 // 8:40 am
In this age of skyrocketing compensation for chief executives and dwindling prospects for drugmakers, there is increasing investor angst that boardrooms are either out of touch, unimaginative or simply indifferent to the protestations that pay packages do not match shareholder interests. The issue has engulfed Johnson & Johnson’s Bill Weldon and, in years past, Dan Vasella at Novartis, for instance.
So what to do? Well, pharma boards could start by shifting away from an emphasis on financial measurements - such as EPS, or earnings per share, and EBITDA, or earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization - to calculate and compare performance, and start focusing on pipeline innovation, according to The Hay Group, a consulting firm that measured ceo pay and incentives. In other words, the incentive part of ceo compensation - beyond salary, that is - should be based on long-term incentives and not short-term ratios. “The whole point of an incentive plan is to create incentives,” says Matt Gurin, vp of life sciences at Hay. “But the only thing big pharma cares about are financial ratios. And these are actually lagging indicators. It’s very disappointing.”
Before reaching this conclusion, the firm examined proxy reports filed recently by 50 US companies - big pharma, mid-sized drugmakers and biotechs - and found that 80 percent of the metrics used by the largest drugmakers to determine incentives were financial measurements, but only 12 percent were tied to progress involving drug development and commercialization. “We always worry when a company gets too focused on a ratio,” Gurin explains. “And one way is to boost the EPS is to buy back shares. It’s a classic maneuver, but says nothing about long-term value. Instead, it was all about lagging indicators of making money and to see if the company is still considered valuable…But a true leading indicator of value creation is the pipeline.”
To turn things around, he suggests that boards examine the role of salary and incentives. For instance, at one large drugmaker, the EPS and EBITDA was used to determine both short and long-term incentives. “This mean they’re paying the ceo twice for the same thing, which doesn’t make sense. The job is to drive financial outcomes and the long-term health of the company, and that’s what the salary is for. Why pay again in terms of incentives?” he posits.
What would be more helpful, he continues, is getting answers to such questions as whether the ceo and senior exec team is positioning the company correctly with certain acquisitions and deals for drug development. “When is the last time a drugmaker reported two years later on the progress of a big merger, other than synergies? As a Pfizer shareholder, for example, that’s something I’d like to see.” Another suggestion: incorporate pipeline progress into incentive plans, by creating criteria that can be used for reliable modeling. “We’re not seeing senior executives really worry about real value creation in the pipeline,” Gurin says. “So the question is why aren’t the boards doing the same modeling to align executive behavior with what analysts are saying drives value?”
For smaller companies, such as biotechs with just one product, the goals and measurements surrounding development and commercialization may be much easier to ascertain. But for big pharma, “this is much trickier. We’re saying the big companies are hiding behind the excuse that this is much tricker, so they’re going to measure by financials. But that system isn’t working.”
Of course, he acknowledges that the specter of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and FDA oversight have limited risk taking in the boardroom. But, Gurin argues, this aversion to risk also inhibits long-term progress and, hence, undermines the usefulness of relying on financial ratios to set long-term incentives. And in an era when drugmakers must scramble more than ever to develop new medicines and new approaches for doing so, an emphasis must be placed on pipeline progress. “You’re going to get what you pay for and if you pay for consistent, predictable earnings,” he says, “well, that tends not to highly correlate with innovation.”
NJBiologist
It almost pains me to say this, but… I think most investors have a very short-term view, and their interests line up pretty well with the executives.
I also worry about a “fling the drug candidate over the wall” mentality setting in if CEOs have an objective to advance so many molecules through so many transition points.
I agree that R&D are critical to sustained industry health, but I can’t figure out a way to work that into a net present value calculation–it almost always falls outside the 10 year window where future gains are trivial vs. next year’s cash flow.
g
I almost wonder if it would be better if drug companies were privately owned. They could get VC money but their stock price would not force short-sighted moves by the executives.
MG Consultant
I can’t say as I agree with the previous comment. I would agree that analysts have a short-term view, but large and institutional investors should be concerned about long-term value creation because they sure haven’t gotten it despite the current model of focusing on qtly earnings. Top 9 U.S. companies market cap over past decade? Down $600 Billion. TRS, EBITDA and EPS are simple proxies for performance but haven’t helped solve the huge innovation problem in this sector.
So, while this is a thorny issue — and I agree that milestones are a poor proxy for innovation — it is a problem that is worth solving thoughtfully.
As H.L. Mencken said, “For every complex problem there is an answer that is clear, simple, and wrong.”
Insider
Get rid of all your senior people and give the young reps plenty of money to spend on physicians. Pfizer thinks that will solve their problems.
Salient point
g-There are a few that are privately held, notably Purdue. Along with more long-term thinking, another advantage is that it’s harder for the competition to find out what’s in the pipeline, because there are no shareholder reports to consult.
There are significant downsides, though. VC money is a trickle compared to the wave of public money. Also, risk exposure is greater, both market-wise & legally (as Purdue execs found out).
g
Just a thought…becoming privately held could help create better possibilities for long term value creation for large institutional investors.
Through a privately held company, they could divvy up the actual drugs. Large institutional investors would not need to invest in buying shares of mega-drug company X that has too many drug reps, bloated research budgets, bureaucracy, etc. They could invest in rights to the profits from a specific drug.
The current system has been ineffective for the last decade. Looking at fundamental restructuring of the drug industry in last 7 years or so, we need to get creative about different financial incentives for CEO’s, institutional investors, investors, etc., in order to create effective and innovative drugs.